Classic case of Triangulation

Thomas Friedman's on the current state of Israel-Palestinian Peace process.


If you think this latest Israeli-American flap was just the same-old-same-old tiff over settlements, then you’re clearly not paying attention — which is how I’d describe a lot of Israelis, Arabs and American Jews today.

This tiff actually reflects a tectonic shift that has taken place beneath the surface of Israel-U.S. relations. I’d summarize it like this: In the last decade, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process — for Israel — has gone from being a necessity to a hobby. And in the last decade, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process — for America — has gone from being a hobby to a necessity. Therein lies the problem.

The collapse of the Oslo peace process, combined with the unilateral Israeli pullouts from Lebanon and Gaza — which were followed not by peace but by rocket attacks by Hezbollah and Hamas on Israel — decimated Israel’s peace camp and the political parties aligned with it.

At the same time, Israel’s erecting of a wall around the West Bank to prevent Palestinian suicide bombers from entering Israel (there have been no successful attacks since 2006), along with the rise of the high-tech industry in Israel — which does a great deal of business digitally and over the Internet and is largely impervious to the day-to-day conflict — has meant that even without peace, Israel can enjoy a very peaceful existence and a rising standard of living.

To put it another way, the collapse of the peace process, combined with the rise of the wall, combined with the rise of the Web, has made peacemaking with Palestinians much less of a necessity for Israel and much more of a hobby. Consciously or unconsciously, a lot more Israelis seem to believe they really can have it all: a Jewish state, a democratic state and a state in all of the Land of Israel, including the West Bank — and peace.

Why not? Newsweek’s Dan Ephron wrote in the Jan. 11, 2010, issue: “An improved security situation, a feeling that acceptance by Arabs no longer matters much, and a growing disaffection from politics generally have, for many Israelis, called into question the basic calculus that has driven the peace process. Instead of pining for peace, they’re now asking: who needs it? ... Tourism hit a 10-year high in 2008. Astonishingly, the I.M.F. projected recently that Israel’s G.D.P. will grow faster in 2010 than that of most other developed countries. In short, Israelis are enjoying a peace dividend without a peace agreement.”

Now, in the same time period, America went from having only a small symbolic number of soldiers in the Middle East to running two wars there — in Iraq and Afghanistan — as well as a global struggle against violent Muslim extremists. With U.S. soldiers literally walking the Arab street — and, therefore, more in need than ever of Muslim good will to protect themselves and defeat Muslim extremists — Israeli-Palestinian peace has gone from being a post-cold-war hobby of U.S. diplomats to being a necessity.

Both Vice President Joe Biden and Gen. David Petraeus have been quoted recently as saying that the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict foments anti-U.S. sentiments, because of the perception that America usually sides with Israel, and these sentiments are exploited by Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran to generate anti-Americanism that complicates life for our soldiers in the region. I wouldn’t exaggerate this, but I would not dismiss it either.

The issue that should make peacemaking a necessity rather than a hobby for both the U.S. and Israel is confronting a nuclear Iran. Unfortunately, Israel sees the question of preventing Iran from going nuclear as overriding and separate from the Palestinian issue, while the U.S. sees them as integrated. At a time when the U.S. is trying to galvanize a global coalition to confront Iran, at a time when Iran uses the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict to embarrass pro-U.S. Arabs and extend its influence across the Muslim world, peace would be a strategic asset for America and Israel.

Ari Shavit, a columnist for the Israeli daily Haaretz, last week argued that Israel should adopt a more integrated view — which he calls a “Palestine-Iran-Palestine” strategy: Israel should take the initiative with an overture to the Palestinians, which would make progress on that front easier, which would strengthen the U.S. coalition against Iran, which could ultimately weaken Tehran and its allies, Hamas and Hezbollah, which would open the way for more progress on the Palestine-Israel front. He suggests that Israel reach an interim agreement with Palestinians on the West Bank or even consider a partial, unilateral withdrawal there.

“One way or another,” said Shavit, “Netanyahu should have made a genuine move on the Palestinian front that would have made genuine moves on the Iranian front possible, that would have made dealing with the core of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute possible at a later stage.”

Indeed, Jerusalem, settlements, peace, Iran — they’re all connected and pretending you can treat some as a hobby and one as a necessity is an illusion.

The Lords of Strategy

Book review by WSJ

As a business journalist and former editorial director of the Harvard Business Review, Walter Kiechel has had the unenviable task of spending much of his life hanging around with management theorists. These are the folks who bring out book after book of business advice that readers find unreadable and managers find unmanageable. Yet by some miracle Mr. Kiechel has remained immune to the maladies of the genre. His "The Lords of Strategy" is a clear, deft and cogent portrait of what the author calls the most powerful business idea of the past half-century: the realization that corporate leaders needed to abandon their go-it-alone focus on their company's fortunes and instead pursue policies based on a detailed study of the competitive environment and of broader business trends.

The "strategy revolution" began in the 1960s when the Boston Consulting Group upended the industry. Rather than take the usual tack of just cozying up to individual chief executives for a bit of corporate kibitzing and calling it consulting, BCG produced a series of elegant intellectual models that could be broadly applied across the business world. BCG's model for the "experience curve," for instance, taught companies that they could reduce their costs as they expanded their market share, thanks to the accumulation of know-how. The "growth share matrix" encouraged companies to view themselves not as an undifferentiated whole but as a portfolio of businesses that make different contributions to the bottom line ("cash cows" vs. "dogs," for example). Nowadays that sort of thinking might be unexceptional, but it was a radical development in the stagnant, inward-looking world of 1960s corporate America.

The 1970s and the decades that followed saw the institutionalization of the revolution. One of BCG's main competitors, McKinsey & Co., shook itself out of a complacent torpor and began enthusiastically running out its own management-strategy models. Bill Bain and several other BCG executives left the company in the 1970s and started a rival enterprise, Bain & Co. Meanwhile, Michael Porter brought strategy to the heart of the business establishment, the Harvard Business School. He added a powerful tool to the discipline's arsenal, the notion of the "value chain," which helped managers break down a business into its component parts, from raw materials to finished products, and then subject those parts to the rigors of cost-benefit analysis.

Yet success brought intense scrutiny and self-examination. In 1982, Tom Peters and Robert Waterman—McKinsey stars at the time—argued in the best-selling "In Search of Excellence" that the obsession with strategy was leading managers to ignore the human side of things. The year before, Richard Pascale, another McKinseyian, said in "The Art of Japanese Management" that the Japanese, who were then sweeping all before them, regarded the West's newfound passion for strategy as strange, much "as we might regard their enthusiasm for kabuki or sumo wrestling." And an army of young thinkers began shifting attention to more nuts-and-bolts matters, such as business processes (which could be re-engineered) and "core competencies" (which needed to be cultivated).

Today the status of strategic thinking in the business world is somewhat confused: An idea that owed its appeal to the seemingly hard truths presented by models is becoming ever more nebulous. The lords of strategy are now given to happy talk about "people"—on the grounds that people are the key to innovation and innovation is the key to long-term success. Such concerns can easily degenerate into bromides about the need to treat employees well. Perhaps it is no coincidence that, at least before the current financial crisis wreaked its havoc, young business hotshots were turning their attention to financial engineering. About a third of former McKinsey and BCG consultants currently work in the private-equity business.

"The Lords of Strategy" is at its best describing and explaining the evolution of an influential idea in American business. The book is less successful as the "secret history" it claims to be. Mr. Kiechel has the habit of pulling aside the veil on the darker side of the management business only to pull it back again. He says that management gurus are known to hire ghost-writing outfits such as Wordworks to produce their books—but he refrains from telling us the gritty ( perhaps disgraceful) details of the marketing and packaging process. He notes that a worrying number of consulting engagements end in tears—McKinsey had a long-term relationship with Enron, for example—but he skimps on evidence.

Mr. Kiechel makes up for this coyness, though, with his enthusiasm for telling the bigger story at the heart of his book: the intellectualization of business. Back in the days of the "organization man" in the 1950s, business people tended to be affable types—pleasant, easy to get along with, but hardly rocket scientists. Since then an ever greater amount of brain power has been applied to business as more and more graduate students pursue MBAs (150,000 annually in the U.S., up from 3,000 a year in 1948), and the brightest MBAs often go on to become business consultants.

The story that Mr. Kiechel tells does not have a particularly happy ending: The "quants" who would supposedly take business to a new level of intellectual sophistication designed financial tools such as the credit default swap that instead took the world economy to the brink of catastrophe. But Mr. Kiechel is surely right that we cannot begin to understand the world that we live in unless we grasp how corporate intellectuals came to have such a dramatic influence on the business world—and how old-fashioned virtues, such as judgment and common sense, were side-lined in the process.

Fed's Balance sheet

From the WSJ:

FED's Balance sheet as of 16th March 2010

To save US automobile industry don't save GM

It's an old article written by Mitt Romney.

IF General Motors, Ford and Chrysler get the bailout that their chief executives asked for yesterday, you can kiss the American automotive industry goodbye. It won’t go overnight, but its demise will be virtually guaranteed.

Without that bailout, Detroit will need to drastically restructure itself. With it, the automakers will stay the course — the suicidal course of declining market shares, insurmountable labor and retiree burdens, technology atrophy, product inferiority and never-ending job losses. Detroit needs a turnaround, not a check.

I love cars, American cars. I was born in Detroit, the son of an auto chief executive. In 1954, my dad, George Romney, was tapped to run American Motors when its president suddenly died. The company itself was on life support — banks were threatening to deal it a death blow. The stock collapsed. I watched Dad work to turn the company around — and years later at business school, they were still talking about it. From the lessons of that turnaround, and from my own experiences, I have several prescriptions for Detroit’s automakers.

First, their huge disadvantage in costs relative to foreign brands must be eliminated. That means new labor agreements to align pay and benefits to match those of workers at competitors like BMW, Honda, Nissan and Toyota. Furthermore, retiree benefits must be reduced so that the total burden per auto for domestic makers is not higher than that of foreign producers.

That extra burden is estimated to be more than $2,000 per car. Think what that means: Ford, for example, needs to cut $2,000 worth of features and quality out of its Taurus to compete with Toyota’s Avalon. Of course the Avalon feels like a better product — it has $2,000 more put into it. Considering this disadvantage, Detroit has done a remarkable job of designing and engineering its cars. But if this cost penalty persists, any bailout will only delay the inevitable.

Second, management as is must go. New faces should be recruited from unrelated industries — from companies widely respected for excellence in marketing, innovation, creativity and labor relations.

The new management must work with labor leaders to see that the enmity between labor and management comes to an end. This division is a holdover from the early years of the last century, when unions brought workers job security and better wages and benefits. But as Walter Reuther, the former head of the United Automobile Workers, said to my father, “Getting more and more pay for less and less work is a dead-end street.”

You don’t have to look far for industries with unions that went down that road. Companies in the 21st century cannot perpetuate the destructive labor relations of the 20th. This will mean a new direction for the U.A.W., profit sharing or stock grants to all employees and a change in Big Three management culture.

The need for collaboration will mean accepting sanity in salaries and perks. At American Motors, my dad cut his pay and that of his executive team, he bought stock in the company, and he went out to factories to talk to workers directly. Get rid of the planes, the executive dining rooms — all the symbols that breed resentment among the hundreds of thousands who will also be sacrificing to keep the companies afloat.

Investments must be made for the future. No more focus on quarterly earnings or the kind of short-term stock appreciation that means quick riches for executives with options. Manage with an eye on cash flow, balance sheets and long-term appreciation. Invest in truly competitive products and innovative technologies — especially fuel-saving designs — that may not arrive for years. Starving research and development is like eating the seed corn.

Just as important to the future of American carmakers is the sales force. When sales are down, you don’t want to lose the only people who can get them to grow. So don’t fire the best dealers, and don’t crush them with new financial or performance demands they can’t meet.

It is not wrong to ask for government help, but the automakers should come up with a win-win proposition. I believe the federal government should invest substantially more in basic research — on new energy sources, fuel-economy technology, materials science and the like — that will ultimately benefit the automotive industry, along with many others. I believe Washington should raise energy research spending to $20 billion a year, from the $4 billion that is spent today. The research could be done at universities, at research labs and even through public-private collaboration. The federal government should also rectify the imbedded tax penalties that favor foreign carmakers.

But don’t ask Washington to give shareholders and bondholders a free pass — they bet on management and they lost.

The American auto industry is vital to our national interest as an employer and as a hub for manufacturing. A managed bankruptcy may be the only path to the fundamental restructuring the industry needs. It would permit the companies to shed excess labor, pension and real estate costs. The federal government should provide guarantees for post-bankruptcy financing and assure car buyers that their warranties are not at risk.

In a managed bankruptcy, the federal government would propel newly competitive and viable automakers, rather than seal their fate with a bailout check.

The Latest AIG Story: Regulators can't agree on what the real systemic threat was

Will regulators ever coherently explain why AIG could not be allowed to go bankrupt in September of 2008?

At yesterday's House hearing, Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner and predecessor Hank Paulson said they didn't bail out AIG to save its derivatives counterparties. Instead, said Mr. Geithner, the now-famous 100-cents-on-the-dollar buyouts of credit default swap contracts were necessary to prevent a further downgrade of AIG by credit-ratings agencies.

This topic probably deserves another hearing on its own. Remember, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where Mr. Geithner was president, had by that time already seized AIG. We're guessing that a ratings agency is pretty comfortable with the creditworthiness of a firm 79.9%-owned by Uncle Sam. Yet Mr. Geithner is saying that the same credit raters that applied triple-A ratings to tranches of junk mortgages somehow got the yips when the world's most respected borrower was standing behind AIG.

If the agencies had applied to AIG the credit rating of its new owner, there wouldn't have been much need to send more collateral to such counterparties as Goldman Sachs. Instead, AIG could have demanded the return of some of the collateral it had already posted. Bad news for those counterparties.

More broadly, the hearing showed that the story of why AIG could not be allowed to fail continues to change, which inspires little confidence that Washington can be trusted with new powers to identify and address systemic risk. The original Beltway line was that the systemic risk was caused by AIG's inability to back up the credit default swap contracts it sold, thus endangering counterparties on the other end of these deals. In Washington's original telling, the company's insurance subsidiaries, heavily regulated by states, were safely segregated from the mess.

Yesterday, however, Messrs. Geithner and Paulson went further than ever in stating that the real systemic risk was to AIG's heavily regulated insurance businesses. Their testimony directly contradicts that offered to Congress by former New York Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo, who was AIG's principal insurance regulator at the time.

Last year Mr. Dinallo told the Senate that "The main reason why the federal government decided to rescue AIG was not because of its insurance companies." He was so confident in the health of the AIG subsidiaries that, before the federal bailout, he was working on a plan to transfer $20 billion of their excess reserves to the parent company.

Yesterday, Mr. Geithner said that the "people responsible" for overseeing the insurance subsidiaries "had no idea" about the risks facing AIG policyholders. He's talking about Mr. Dinallo here. Instead of being safely segregated, Mr. Geithner said the insurance businesses were "tightly connected" to the parent company. Mr. Paulson added that the healthy parts of AIG had been "infected" by the "toxic assets." He added, "One part of the company would have contaminated the other."

This raises some serious issues for financial reform. The Geithner and Paulson story now is essentially that the system of heavy state insurance regulation was a sham. When push came to shove, policyholders were not protected from a default by the parent company.

This also makes us wonder about all of the political and media chatter over the last year that derivatives were the doomsday machine that caused the meltdown. If this testimony is correct, then the systemic risk wasn't that if AIG collapsed it would infect Goldman and other financial companies like falling dominoes across the world.

The real risk was closer to an implosion of AIG that would have jeopardized millions of insurance policies. That's a big problem for insurance regulation. But if bad bets on derivatives would only have ruined AIG and its subsidiaries, that's not the same kind of danger to the entire financial system. And it suggests the need for different regulatory changes. We're not sure that policyholders were really in danger, but Mr. Dinallo and other state regulators deserve a chance to respond on the record, and under oath.

If yesterday's testimony is true, the real systemic risk was not in unregulated markets where the danger is obvious, but in markets where regulation created the illusion of safety.